hich ONE issue mattered most in deciding how you voted for president?" This survey question, which appeared on the 2004 National Election Pool~NEP! exit poll, attracted as much controversy as any in recent years. More respondents chose "moral values" than any other issue. Among this 22% of respondents, 80% voted for President Bush. Initially, news reporters and pundits interpreted this finding as indicating that moral values played a decisive role in Bush's victory. The morning after the election, Chris Matthews, host of the MSNBC program Hardball, suggested the election was "a referendum on values"~"Chris Matthews Gives his Assessment"!. Tim Russert, host of NBC's Meet the Press, said that "People had an agenda. They put their moral values ahead of some of their economic interests"~"Analysis"!. A reporter for the CBS Morning News concluded that "in the end, the number-one voter motivator @was# morality"~"Morality Proves Number One"!.
In the weeks that followed, cooler heads prevailed. Polling experts~e.g., Langer 2004!, columnists~e.g., Krauthammer 2004!, and political scientists e.g., Jacobs 2004! poked holes in the "great moral values theory"~Meyer 2004, 1!. Critics pointed out that the term "moral values" is conceptually broader than the other response choices on the exit poll and the percentage of respondents who chose moral values was not appreciably greater than the percentage that chose economy0jobs~20%!, terrorism~19%!, or Iraq~15%!. The inclusion of moral values in the list of most important issues and the subsequent emphasis on moral values in postelection analysis "distracted the country from the real sources of the president's victory and fuelled much distracting de- In their studies of religion and the presidential vote, Layman~1997; 2001! and Kellstedt 2005; Green et al. 2001a Green et al. , 2001b Green et al. , 1997 Guth et al. 2001; Kellstedt et al. 1994a Kellstedt et al. , 1994b ! have shown that emergent cleavages between religious progressives and traditionalists both between and within the major faith traditions have been consequential for presidential voting in recent elections, with religious progressives voting Democratic and religious traditionalists voting Republican~see also Respondents placed each item on the same five-point scale which ran from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." I coded all items to run from the most progressive to the most traditional response and averaged them together. The scale has an alpha of .67, a mean of .56, and a standard deviation of . 22 . The line in Figure 2 shows a fairly linear association between moral values and the vote-moral progressives supported the candidate who took more liberal stands on cultural issues and moral traditionalists supported the candidate who took conservative stands on these issues, with moral moderates splitting their votes between the two candidates. The bivariate association between moral values and vote choice is similar to the strong association we have come to expect between party identification and the vote. To control for this and other potential confounds I regressed presidential vote choice on moral values while controlling for the same set of issues and demographics as Hillygus and Shields 2005!, including attitudes toward the Iraq War, terrorism, the economy, gay marriage, and abortion, as well as partisanship, ideology, race, sex, and marital status.
2 I also controlled for religiosity, which provides an alternative explanation for the effects of moral values on the vote, and an index of domestic policy issues. Details on these measures are listed in the appendix. All variables were coded to range from 0 to 1.
The results of the logit model are presented in To get a more thorough view of these effects, I calculated the change in the predicted probability of voting for Bush across different values of the predictors, holding the other variables constant at their means and indicators at zero. 3 The results are presented in Table 2 . The focus here is on moral values, the domestic policy index, the statistically significant issues, and for comparison, party identification. The left side of Table 2 presents the change in the predicted probability of voting for Bush across a moderate range of values for each of the predictors. For the two continuous variables-moral values and the domestic policy index-this is the change in the probability of voting for Bush as the variable changes from on standard deviation below the mean~here labeled "moderately progressive" for moral values and "moderately liberal" for the domestic policy index! to one standard deviation above the mean~labeled "moderately traditional" for moral values and "moderately conservative" for the domestic policy index!. For the three policy issues~Iraq, terrorism, the economy! and party identification this is a discrete change from one response category of the variable~e.g., "not strong Democrat"! to another response categorỹ e.g., "not strong Republican"!, as indicated in the table. The results show that the probability of voting for Bush increases by .25 as moral values changes from moderately progressive to moderately traditional. The effect of the domestic policy index is about the same: the probability of voting for Bush increases by .22 as attitudes toward domestic policy change from moderately liberal to moderately conservative. The effect of the Iraq War on the vote is greater. As attitudes toward the Iraq War change from "not worth the cost" to "worth the cost," the probability of voting for Bush increases by . 48 . The increase in the predicted probability of voting for Bush is less~.19! as perceptions of the economy change from "somewhat worse" to "somewhat better," and less still~.15! as attitudes change from "somewhat disapprove" to "somewhat approve" of "the way George W. Bush is handling the war on terrorism." By comparison, each of these changes is modest relative to the increase of .63 in the probability of voting for Bush as party identification changes from "not strong Democrat" to "not strong Republican. " These results suggest that perceptions of the war in Iraq outstripped moral values and other policy attitudes in terms of influence on the vote. However, the ranges of these variables may make this analysis misleading. Whereas the Iraq War variable is dichotomous, and thus ranges from its minimum to its maximum, the others are not dichotomous, and have, in this analysis, a more limited range. Perhaps a more even-handed comparison would compare the effects of the variables as each ranges from its minimum to its maximum. The right side of Table 2 presents this analysis. It presents the change in the predicted probability of voting for Bush across the full range of values for each predictor. Here, as moral values changes from its minimum~la-beled "strongly progressive"! to its maximum~labeled "strongly traditional"! the increase in the predicted probability of voting for Bush~.51! is similar to the minimum-to-maximum changes for the domestic policy index~.50!, the Iraq War .47!, terrorism~.43!, and the economỹ .36!, and, again, substantially less than that of party identification~.80!. Overall, the results of this analysis show clearly that moral values influenced vote choice in 2004. Moral progressives voted for Kerry, moral traditionalists for Bush, and the effect of moral values on the vote was about as great as the effects of terrorism, the Iraq War, the economy, and domestic policy issues. Table 1 , calculated using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003) . Standard error of change in predicted probability in parentheses. For moral values, "moderately progressive" is one SD below the mean and "moderately traditional is one SD above the mean. For the domestic policy index, "moderately liberal" is one SD below the mean and "moderately conservative" is one SD above the mean.
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